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Many of those studying Aristotle’s philosophy of science during the last
twenty five years have focused on determining the extent to which the model
of scientific inquiry and explanation developed in the Posterior Analytics is
reflected in the record of Aristotle’s own researches in the physical sciences.
There have been two main challenges. First, the biological and other
physical treatises are put forward in a meandering way, offering an
apparently disorganized mix of observations, consideration of opposing
theories, classifications, and partial explanations that is far from the orderly
array of principles, premises derived from principles, and demonstrative
syllogisms, which one might expect from APo.. Second, many of the
explanations that are offered in these treatises are teleological, explaining
regularities in nature on the basis of how they serve or are necessitated by
the good of various natural kinds. But such explanations do not seem to be
easily cast in demonstrative form. Aristotle’s one attempt at making sense of
how this would work, in APo. 2.11 has been roundly criticized as unclear at
best and an incoherent failure at worst.
Gotthelf, Lennox, and others have shown how the first problem is less
formidable than first appears.1 Aristotle can be seen working his way to
definitions, from which the basic explanatory principles can be derived; he
does so by developing fragmentary explanations, which allow him to
determine and isolate certain core explanatory facts; the completion and
integration of these, and the facts they explain, within the context of a whole
science, remains an incomplete project. It is the second project that has
5/31/2018 Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2011.04.51
http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2011/2011-04-51.html 2/5
proven more recalcitrant, and is Leunessen’s focus in the present study.
There are two major aspects to the project. The first is to isolate and clarify
the various explanatory principles concerning the workings of final
causation in regard to the structure and activities of natural beings. The
second is to clarify what Aristotle means when he says that, even in regard
to teleological explanations, the explanation (aition) is revealed through the
middle term (APo. 2.11 94a20-94a23).
Leunissen begins with the defense given in Phys. 2.8 of the general
applicability to the natural realm of teleological explanations. She offers
preliminary distinctions that will feature prominently in what follows.
Primary teleology “involves the realization of a preexisting potential for
form through stages shaped by conditional necessity, where the fully realized
form constitutes the final cause of the process” (18). In this case, a nature
serves as an efficient cause that is responsible for certain features of that
which has the nature, which features are necessary preconditions for the
existence of that form. Thus, the nature of a bird requires the existence of
wings; a bird’s possession of wings is due to an instance of primary
teleology. In a case of secondary teleology, what is explained is not a
necessary condition for form; it is rather the existence of certain features that
aid or facilitate the performance of certain functions that are determined by
the natural form. The efficient cause of these features is something external
to that natural form; they often arise through “material necessity.” But, given
the existence of these features, they are employed or adapted in a way that is
conducive to the accomplishment of the natural good appropriate to that
kind. In both cases, Leunissen argues, we are dealing with temporal
processes in which earlier stages cause and thereby lead to later stages. It is
the later stage that is the goal, and thus the final cause of the process.
Accordingly, the cause that leads to and is responsible for the goal will be a
formal or efficient cause, not the final cause which is the goal itself. It will
be this formal or efficient cause that will appear in a demonstration as a
middle term; the final cause will feature as the major term.
The distinction between primary and secondary teleology allows Leunissen
to account for what many have taken to be a puzzling aspect of Aristotle’s
argument in Phys. 2.8 that regular connections cannot be the result of
chance: only teleological causation can account for them. His example of a
regular connection is how the rains come in winter, the time (in Greece) at
which the crops grow. This suggests that Aristotle holds that the rain is for
the sake of the crops. This has struck many as a very difficult result, as it
suggests either an un-Aristotelian holism or his attributing some sort of
causal pull of the crops on the rain, which would mean that the physical
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processes internal to evaporation and condensation are insufficient to
account for the rainfall. Leunissen instead suggests that this is a case in
which a certain teleological activity (that of the human art of agriculture)
takes advantage of a process occurring through material causation in order to
facilitate a goal that is not that of the material process per se: it is a case of
secondary causation. In this way, she is able to account for the clear
implication of the text (the growing of the crops is indeed a final cause of the
rain) without attributing to Aristotle the view that facilitating the crops is an
essential aspect of the rainwater or its descent.
Chapter 2 clarifies the teleological role that Aristotle gives to soul. The soul
of a certain kind of living being is a formal cause that determines the natural
goals that it has as a matter of primary teleology. The ensouled body is
geared towards the performance of those goals in a way that displays both
primary and secondary teleology. The biological works build on this
understanding of soul.
The third chapter presents evidence concerning the distinction between
primary and secondary teleology from within Aristotle’s own biological
writings. Leunissen is not the first to point out that Aristotle takes biological
explanations that identify a certain feature as crucially necessary for a goal
to differ in kind from those that indicate that certain features are “for the
better” and that the latter often involve the use of materials that are
generated at the level of material necessity (which do not themselves always
necessitate the parts and functions that they necessarily presuppose), but the
distinction has never been laid out so clearly before. One of her
contributions is to point out that those biological features that are not
necessary but contribute to an organism’s good can be further subdivided
into those that make a contribution to necessary functions (“subsidiary
parts”) and those (which she calls “luxury parts”) that do not benefit the
organism in this way, but rather “contribute to the well being of animals in
some other way” (92). An example is the horns of a goat; a goat can live
without horns, but it lives better with horns, as it is then better able to defend
itself. The distinction between contributions to necessary functions and
contributions to well being has a certain intuitive plausibility, but exactly
what it amounts to is unclear to me. Presumably, self-protection makes a
contribution to vital functions: an animal unable to defend itself against
predators would presumably not be able to engage in basic life functions like
nutrition or reproduction. Perhaps Leunissen wants to say that, unlike luxury
parts, subsidiary parts themselves are directly involved in the performance of
basic life functions. But if the role they play is merely contributory, how
exactly is it the case that it is they that are directly involved in these
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functions? Among the subsidiary parts are kidneys, which assist the bladder
in the collection of residues by providing extra storage space. But how is this
different from how horns assist in the rearing of young by providing
protection for them? The lines between the different sorts of teleology seem
to me to be blurry enough to call into question the cogency of the distinction.
The fourth chapter surveys the use of teleological principles in the biological
works, primarily PA 2-4. These principles are not specific to the individual
physical sciences; they are rather “heuristic principles” that provide the basic
framework for finding what the discovered explanations would look like,
and accordingly guide the investigation into what the relevant demonstrative
principles are. Leunissen surveys the various forms that the superordinate
methodological principle “nature does nothing in vain” might take and the
various patterns of explanation that might be used in making sense of living
things by appeal to such a principle. She shows how a teleological principle
of this kind allows one to engage in thought experiments that determine the
advantage or necessity of regular features of certain biological kinds.
Ch. 5 explores the extent to which the results of the previous chapters can be
applied to Aristotelian cosmology, which, like biology, makes ample use of
teleological explanation. She shows how the cosmological explanations are
extensions of the explanatory strategies that had been so successful in regard
to biological kinds at the terrestrial level, and how Aristotle offers such
explanations in full awareness of their more limited suitability, in light of
how little is empirically known about the heavens.
The final chapter (apart from a summarizing conclusion) turns to the main
issue that has plagued efforts to understand teleological explanations in
conformity with the strictures of the Posterior Analytics: how can the final
cause serve as middle term? Leunissen’s answer is that it doesn’t. Readers
have been misled by Aristotle’s assertion that for all varieties of causation
the aitia is revealed by the middle term, thinking that here, as elsewhere in
Aristotle, aitia is synonymous with aition. Leunissen argues that here, aitia
means “explanation,” not “cause.” Aristotle’s point, then, is that the middle
term is crucial in revealing that whole explanation of the goal that serves as
final cause; it does not itself express that final cause (though it does express
the formal or efficient cause that serves to explain the final cause). I am
dubious of this move, for within the Posterior Analytics, the term aitia is on
two occasions used to refer not to the whole demonstration that serves to
explain and allow one to understand something, but to the cause that such an
explanation identifies. Thus at 71b9-12, the aitia is explicitly identified as
that through which the fact (pragma) is. At 85b21-22, Aristotle uses the term
aitia to refer, not to the logos that reveals the source of error, but to the cause
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of the error itself. One could say that these passages are aberrations in a
book that otherwise consistently employs a term in a way that is aberrant
from the rest of the corpus, but for me the most likely account of APo. 2.11
is still that which is widely accepted: Aristotle goofed.
Even if it does not win general acceptance, the account of the syllogistic
structure of teleological explanations presented in the sixth chapter is one to
be reckoned with. The preceding chapters can be recommended
unconditionally. They offer a clear and wonderfully helpful schematic
presentation of the explanatory and methodological structure of the various
teleological explanations offered in the physical treatises; future readers of
these treatises would be well advised to make ample use of them.
Notes:
 
1.   See especially A. Gotthelf, “First Principles in Aristotle’s Parts of
Animals in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in
Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge, 1987), 167-98, and J. G. Lennox, Aristotle’s
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